The danger for Türkiye here is the possible formation of a strategic alliance between the United States, Israel and Azerbaijan. Directed against Iran, such an alliance would not only isolate Iran, but would also check Russian regional ambitions. Most importantly, however, it would also sideline Türkiye. Although such a precarious alliance seems too difficult given the diverging interests of the potential partners, there has been several recent developments that tend to suggest that such a scenario, and such a sidelining of Türkiye, may be possible.
The return of U.S. President Donal Trump to the White House was widely welcomed in the region. And even after a period of chaos and crisis in the Unted States since the start of the Trump Administration, some still see an opportunity. And for Türkiye, such confidence in gaining from the U.S. crisis remains firm. Yet it still remains a dangerous gamble for Türkiye to depend too much on President Trump.
From Azerbaijan to Türkiye, the election of U.S. President Donald Trump was seen as a welcome development. Even the Georgian government hailed the return of Trump as a validation of its own move away from Europe and closer to Russia.
The view from Azerbaijan was also positive, as Baku was pleased to see an end to the traditional American emphasis on democracy and human rights. With the Trump Administration, the Azerbaijani leadership sees, correctly, that Washington will adopt a more transactional approach to foreign policy, driven by an embrace of “strong” authoritarian leaders and defined by a pursuit of “deals.”
But it is Türkiye that has been most focused on garnering real benefits from the Trump Administration. This was most evident in the recent visit to Washington by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, with a timing that was aimed at seizing the opportunity for regional powers and players, such as Türkiye, just as the United States retreats from its global role.
Such as opportunity is recognized in Ankara and, as the government-affiliated think tank SETA Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research recently argued, Türkiye “can strengthen both its ties with the West and its regional influence” by simply “leveraging the strategic openings created by this structural shift.” (1)
The SETA Foundation report went on to state that “under President Erdoğan’s leadership, Türkiye’s strategic autonomy has become its strongest asset.” And there is a degree of truth in this contention, although it stems more from President Trump’s respect for so-called “strongmen,” like the leaders of Hungary or China, or even North Korea. And that is not exactly a warm welcome for Türkiye in Western eyes.
Nevertheless, it does seem clear that Türkiye can benefit from the unpredictable disruption that now determines U.S. policy. Yet at the same time, the risks of such a move by Türkiye is equally clear and may very well damage its relations with other countries, both in the region and far beyond. This inherent risk for any bet on Trump by Türkiye consists of two distinct and diverging factors.
First, such an embrace of Trump will have broader repercussions elsewhere. This has already been evident in the recent visit to Washington by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, as Israel’s growing divide and mounting tension with Türkiye was important enough to come up in meetings with American officials.
In fact, the seeming determination of Türkiye to align with Trump has also spurred a strong reaction from Israel. And for the Trump Administration, it is Israel, not Türkiye, that is key to ensuring Trump’s success in securing a de-escalation in Gaza or in pursuing some of the more far-fetched American visions of the Middel East. And even the strong position of Türkiye in post-Assad Syria has triggered Israeli concern and even American fear for their Kurdish allies and partners in Syria.
But the second factor of this risk is equally significant and relates to the Iran issue. More specifically, the danger for Türkiye here is the possible formation of a strategic alliance between the United States, Israel and Azerbaijan. Directed against Iran, such an alliance would not only isolate Iran, but would also check Russian regional ambitions. Most importantly, however, it would also sideline Türkiye. Although such a precarious alliance seems too difficult given the diverging interests of the potential partners, there has been several recent developments that tend to suggest that such a scenario, and such a sidelining of Türkiye, may be possible.
These recent developments, as noted by Azerbaijani analyst Fuad Shahbazov, include a surprise visit to Baku by President Trump’s special envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, on March 14. That visit was also seen an American response to Israeli pressure on the U.S. to take a harder line on Iran, especially after President Trump’s new attempt to broker a fresh nuclear agreement with Tehran. And even in that context, a potential Israel-Azerbaijan-U.S. axis adds some muscle to any threat against Iran.
But adding insult to injury, the sidelining of Türkiye in this scenario is only exacerbated by the fact that Azerbaijan benefits most from this situation, further revealing the ascending power of Baku over Ankara. And further cementing this posture, as Shahbazov points out, the Trump Administration will “undoubtedly” endorse a deeper Azerbaijan-Israel partnership against Iran, especially in light of the recent purchase by Azerbaijani State Oil Company (SOCAR) of a 10% stake in Israel’s Tamar gas field near Haifa. (2)
Despite the fact that these risks and scenarios remain dynamic and far from concrete, the unpredictable and reckless nature of today’s Washington under Trump means that Türkiye can not afford to bet everything on winning in the disruptive games underway in the U.S. crisis.
(1) Üstün, Kadir, “Fidan’s Visit to Washington and Türkiye’s Strategic Autonomy,” SETA Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research, 29 March 2025.
(2) Shahbazov, Fuad “Can Netanyahu Form a U.S.-Israel-Azerbaijan Axis Against Iran?” Gulf International Forum, April 2025.
(Richard Giragosian is the director of the Regional Studies Center (RSC), an independent think tank in Yerevan Armenia)