RICHARD GIRAGOSIAN

In fact, it is precisely this issue of normalization with Armenia that has revealed just how much Azerbaijan holds the upper hand over Türkiye. The power of Azerbaijan’s influence and pressure over Türkiye’s options toward Armenia has now become a relationship of embarrassing weakness for Türkiye.

During a meeting with the visiting Turkish journalists, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan provided a detailed overview of his government’s policies and perspectives regarding both relations with Türkiye as well as broader issues, including Armenia’s post-war negotiations with Azerbaijan. Second recent development that is even more significant as a driver for progress between Armenia and Türkiye. This notable development was the sudden announcement of a breakthrough agreement over the text of the draft bilateral peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The fundamental weakness of this agreement rests with the absence of any international monitoring and no international guarantee. This only means that the risk lies with the “day after” any signing ceremony.

The third seismic shift from the earthquake is rooted in a more localized, but direct impact on Armenia-Turkey “normalization.” In what is now a breakthrough in normalization between Armenia and Turkey, the re-opening of the border is the most obvious validation of “earthquake diplomacy.”

Although much of the Antalya event was focused on the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Armenian foreign minister was a sought-after guest, with great media interest. The Armenian participation was significant for two main reasons.

Yet it is now clear that for Pashinyan, forcing the former corrupt authoritarian regime from power was far easier than actually governing the country. But this election was very much a stark choice between the past and the future.

As in the earlier wars of both April 2016 and September-October 2020, Armenia is dangerously under-equipped and ill-prepared. Any chance to seize diplomatic opportunities to salvage what remains of Karabakh may be lost, as neither Armenia nor Karabakh have a diplomatic strategy. And there is a related absence of any “end state” objective for Karabakh.

But after the end of the war for Karabakh, there are many questions over what comes next, with no clear answers and even fewer certainties.